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Abstract
Focus group methodology generates distinct ethical challenges that do not correspond fully 
to those raised by one-to-one interviews. This paper explores, in both conceptual and prac-
tical terms, three key issues: consent; confidentiality and anonymity; and risk of harm. The 
principal challenge in obtaining consent lies in giving a clear account of what will take 
place in the group, owing to unpredictability of the discussion and interaction that will 
occur. As consent can be seen in terms of creating appropriate expectations in the par-
ticipant, this may therefore be hard to achieve. Moreover, it is less straightforward for the 
participant to revoke consent than in one-to-one interviews. Confidentiality and anonymity 
are potentially problematic because of the researcher’s limited control over what partici-
pants may subsequently communicate outside the group. If the group discussion encour-
ages over-disclosure by some participants, this problem becomes more acute. Harm in a 
focus group may arise from the discussion of sensitive topics, and this may be amplified by 
the public nature of the discussion. A balance should be struck between avoiding or clos-
ing down potentially distressing discussion and silencing the voices of certain participants 
to whom such discussion may be important or beneficial. As a means of addressing the 
above issues, we outline some strategies that can be adopted in the consent process, in a 
preliminary briefing session, during moderation of the focus group, and in a subsequent 
debriefing, and suggest that these strategies can be employed synergistically so as to rein-
force each other.
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1 Introduction
The ethics of interview research have been widely discussed. In contrast, ethical aspects 
of focus group research have received somewhat less detailed attention. Just as the meth-
odology of dyadic interviews may raise ethical issues that do not correspond fully to those 
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raised by one-to-one interviews (Lowton 2018), so focus group methodology raises dis-
tinct challenges. This paper will examine these challenges, in both conceptual and practical 
terms, focusing on issues relating to consent, confidentiality, and risk of harm.
1.1  Definition of a focus group
The focus group has its origins in an approach to group interviewing described by Merton 
et al. (1956). Since then, it has gained increasing popularity within qualitative research and 
evaluation. A focus group can be defined broadly as ‘a type of group discussion about a 
topic under the guidance of a trained group moderator’ (Stewart 2018: p. 687). Agar and 
MacDonald (1995) suggest that a focus group lies somewhere between a meeting (reflect-
ing the fact that it is specifically organized in advance and has a structure) and a conversa-
tion (reflecting the fact that the discussion has nonetheless a degree of spontaneity, with 
individuals picking up on one another’s contributions). It is recommended that data col-
lection, and subsequent analysis, should take account of both the dialogue and the interac-
tion that has occurred within the group (Kitzinger 1994; Smithson 2000; Halkier 2010; 
Grønkjær et al. 2011), and seek to capture the way in which meaning is negotiated and co-
produced in the group context (Wilkinson 1998). Several detailed accounts of focus group 
methodology are available (e.g., Morgan 1997; Hennink 2007; Krueger and Casey 2009; 
Carey and Asbury 2012; Barbour 2018).
2  Consent
Consent is a central ethical concern in research using human participants. Its specific 
importance in focus group research is suggested by Green and Hart’s view of this method 
as one in which participants have a particular vulnerability, as they ‘are not only persuaded 
by skilled facilitators to disclose intimate views, but also to do this in front of peers’ (Green 
and Hart 1999: p. 31).
There are two models of consent: the mental model of consent sees it as the mental state 
of the person consenting, whereas the performative model sees it as the public act whereby 
such consent is communicated (Schnüriger 2018). On either interpretation, consent serves 
to legitimize the researcher’s actions. Hence, Walker (2018: p. 131) takes consent to be a 
form of communication whereby ‘an act that would have been impermissible for some rea-
son is no longer impermissible for that reason.’
The underlying moral ground of consent is centred primarily in the notion of autonomy, 
on the basis that the consent process can be seen as a means of protecting and supporting 
autonomous decision making on the part of the research participant (Faden and Beauchamp 
1986; Beauchamp 2009). Additionally, it is supported by the associated principle of respect 
for persons, which requires one not to use a person merely as a means to an end (Downie 
and Telfer 1969). Consent may be seen as having four essential elements: disclosure (the 
adequacy of the information given by the researcher); comprehension (the extent to which 
this information is understood by the participant); competence (the participant’s cognitive 
or emotional capacity to give or withhold agreement); and voluntariness (the absence of 
inducement of coercion). Fulfilment of each of these elements is necessary for informed 
consent to carry its intended moral force (Sim 2010).
Lack of information—i.e., inadequate disclosure—is a constraint upon autonomous 
decision making (Beauchamp 1997). The onus is therefore on the researcher to provide 
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a suitable type and quantity of information as a basis for the participant’s choice. In inter-
view-based studies, such information usually states the purpose of the study, gives an out-
line of the topic(s) to be covered, indicates the way in which the interview will be con-
ducted and how long it is likely to last, draws attention to any potential benefits or risks 
associated with taking part, and describes what will be done with the data collected. Using 
the details provided, the participant should be able to foresee or imagine the situation to 
which he or she is consenting—therefore, the process is perhaps better seen as creating 
(or perhaps modifying) certain expectations in the mind of the participant rather than as 
simply the conveying of information. Such expectations will be formed by the manner and 
context in which information is communicated, and not just by the factual content of this 
information, and it is therefore more appropriate to think in terms of the message received 
in the consent process than in terms of the message sent.
2.1  Disclosure and consent
One potentially problematic issue relating to consent in focus groups stems from the 
degree of disclosure that is possible. In qualitative research generally, the fact that design 
and methods are to some extent emergent—rather than pre-specified, as they usually are 
in quantitative research—makes it hard to provide fine-grained detail on what will occur 
in a study (Wiles 2013). This applies even more in focus group research, because what 
takes place in the group depends in part upon other participants, who may spontaneously 
raise issues not necessarily intended, or predicted, by the moderator. As Warr (2005: p. 
203) puts it, focus groups can be noisy ‘as opinions and anecdotes are shared, challenged, 
and truncated as participants join in, or drop out of, the discussions taking place.’ Further-
more, individual participants have less control than in a one-to-one interview. Although 
focus group participants can decline to respond to a particular question—probably more 
easily than in a one-to-one interview—they may not be able to divert the discussion away 
from a topic that they find uncomfortable. In effect, they may be unable to foreclose a par-
ticular topic in a way that is possible in an individual interview, particularly in the pres-
ence of more dominant group members.1 Accordingly, to the extent that the discussion in a 
focus group may take an unanticipated turn, reliance on the disclosure element of consent 
is thereby weakened.
Turning to the information that is disclosed, as noted earlier this will create particular 
expectations in participants. Some of these expectations may be inaccurate owing to cer-
tain assumptions on the part of participants. For example, they may not appreciate that 
whilst a focus group may be about exploring a social or health-related problem, it does not 
necessarily aim to provide solutions to such problems (Carey and Asbury 2012). Such a 
misconception may be encouraged by the ‘consultative’ feel of a group discussion, and the 
fact that focus groups are sometimes used in service evaluation and quality improvement 
projects (Smith et al. 1995; Schwarz et al. 2000). In this connection, for example, Briller 
et al. (2007–8) argue that it should be made clear to potential participants in a focus group 
on bereavement that they are not being invited to a support group.
1 It is commonly recommended that participants within a focus group should be homogeneous (Morgan 
1997; Krueger and Casey 2009), so as to minimize differences in status or power and to prevent the dis-
cussion being dominated by higher-status members of the group. However, if such differences in status or 
power nonetheless occur, they may further limit the ability of some members to influence the discussion.
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A second issue arises here in relation to the contribution that the participant anticipates 
making to the group discussion. If the researcher obtains consent on the basis of seeking 
the participant’s views, there is a responsibility to ensure that the individual has an oppor-
tunity to express these views, otherwise the expectation on which consent was based may 
not be realized. Ensuring that this expectation is fulfilled may require skilful moderation, 
so as to facilitate participation by all group members. Kitzinger (1995: p. 300) notes that 
within focus groups ‘the articulation of group norms may silence individual voices of dis-
sent’; however, the moderator may offset this tendency by encouraging contributions from 
such individuals (Smithson 2000). The other side of this coin is that participants should not 
feel obliged to contribute to a particular line of discussion, and again careful moderation 
is needed here. Lezaun (2007) characterizes an underlying principle of the focus group as 
isegoric—a concern to provide all participants with an equal opportunity to express (or to 
decline to express) their views. This obligation may be heightened by the expectations cre-
ated in the consent process.
However, although participants may expect to have their voices heard, they should 
understand that the predominant insights that emerge from the focus group, and that are 
subsequently reported, may not reflect their individual views (especially if the issue is 
controversial, giving a rise to a range of possibly conflicting viewpoints). This is partly 
because it is not feasible to report each participant’s views, and also because it is not the 
primary intention of a focus group to do so, given that whilst individual views may be 
voiced during the meeting, and may be tracked in the analysis (Finch and Lewis 2003), 
these are not readily separable from the interaction occurring within the group. Hence, the 
analytical focus centres on the co-production of perspectives in the group context, rather 
than on the perceptions of specific individuals: focus groups ‘are not used to generate mul-
tiple accounts of individual perspectives’ (Warr 2005: p. 201) and are not ‘a collection of 
individual interviews with comments directed solely through the researcher’ (Finch and 
Lewis 2003: p. 171).
A common practice in qualitative research based on interview data is respondent vali-
dation (Lincoln and Guba 1985). Its purpose is to allow research participants to review 
and comment on a transcript and/or the researcher’s interpretation of it. In focus group 
research, however, a decision to provide a transcript to an individual participant entails 
also providing a written record of other participants’ contributions, as it is hard to extract 
an individual account from the text in the transcript. Each participant would thereby be 
provided with a written record of the data provided by the whole group. This may not have 
been anticipated by other participants, and is therefore something of which they should be 
made aware in the consent process. Respondent validation would therefore be hard to carry 
out unless consented to by all participants.
2.2  Consent as revocable
Consent is normally regarded as revocable, such that an individual can withdraw from the 
study at any point after initially consenting to participate (Faden and Beauchamp 1986). It 
is important to consider the extent to which this option can realistically be exercised in a 
focus group. Withdrawing from a group discussion is a very public and potentially disrup-
tive act that an individual may find hard to perform. Additionally, in consent documenta-
tion the right to withdraw is often stated in terms of not having to give a reason or justi-
fication for doing so—this would be difficult in a group situation, as leaving a collective 
social activity prematurely normally demands some form of explanation. Revoking consent 
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to participation is thus less straightforward in a focus group than in many other research 
contexts.
This principle that consent is revocable may also be extended to an individual’s data. 
Just as participants may withdraw their participation in an interview, it is claimed that 
they may similarly withdraw their data, either from the transcript, or from those parts that 
are reported as quotations, or from both (Kervin et al. 2006).2 A withdrawal of consent to 
the use of quotations presents fewer problems as regards the integrity of a study, as the 
insights arising from the analysis of the data concerned can still be reported, even though 
the researcher’s choice of evidence to support them may be restricted. However, withdraw-
ing data from a transcript prior to analysis—which is sometimes proposed (Farquhar 1999; 
Barbour 2018)—can give rise to particular difficulties in focus group research.
First, if data were to be removed from a transcript prior to analysis, notwithstanding the 
difficulty of doing so, the inferences that can be drawn from the transcript as a whole may 
be undermined. Meaning in focus group analysis is derived to a large degree from the dia-
logue that occurs between participants, rather than from what individual participants, taken 
singly, have said. The analytical insights that emerge are co-constructed by all the partici-
pants, and indeed by the moderator also. Thus, the removal of a section of dialogue may 
make it hard, or even impossible, to meaningfully interpret subsequent dialogue. Excising 
material from the transcript may therefore limit the extent to which a coherent analysis can 
occur.
Second, it follows from the preceding point that if the removal of one person’s data 
adversely affects the insights that can be gained from a focus group, this affects the extent 
to which other participants’ contributions to the discussion can play a part in the subse-
quent analysis. So not only does the withdrawal reduce the contribution of the person 
whose data they are, but it also denies other participants a full opportunity to make such a 
contribution.
Probably the only way to resolve this problem is to make it explicit in the consent pro-
cess that whilst a participant can withdraw from the group, and may ask that his or her data 
are not quoted when the study is reported, withdrawing data prior to analysis is simply not 
possible. Accordingly, the inability to retract their data in this way is something to which 
participants will have consented. There might nonetheless be a concern that limiting indi-
viduals’ ability to withdraw their data goes against the fundamental idea that consent is 
revocable, and thereby fails to respect their autonomy. So, it might be objected that auton-
omy implies the right to refuse, and that such refusal can occur at any stage in the research 
process. Three responses can be made to this objection. First, autonomy does not automati-
cally imply that one may change one’s mind. One can make an autonomous choice that one 
understands to be binding, such as when making a promise or signing a contract. Such a 
choice is not a sacrifice of autonomy—the commitment that it involves can be seen as an 
expression of one’s autonomy. Second, given that other participants are likely to have con-
sented to the focus group on the basis of having their views heard and contributing to what 
is gained from the subsequent analysis of the data, an attempt to respect one individual’s 
2 In both cases, unless all dialogue in the focus group has been accurately ascribed to identifiable individu-
als—which may be challenging, given Warr’s view (2005: p. 203) that focus group interaction may some-
times be ‘disorderly and noisy’—it may not be possible to omit the data relating to any one such individual. 
Perhaps a more serious problem is that another’s data could be removed by mistake.
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autonomous choice has the consequence of undermining such choice by others.3 Third, the 
detrimental effect on the analysis of withdrawing data in this way is liable to frustrate the 
moral obligation of the researcher to maximize the value of the insights gained from the 
study. Together, these three considerations may override what would otherwise be an obli-
gation respect the participant’s wishes.4
3  Confidentiality and anonymity
Confidentiality and anonymity are often treated more or less synonymously.5 There are, 
however, important distinctions that can be drawn between these two concepts, and the 
related notion of privacy. Confidentiality relates to what is done with information once it is 
in the researcher’s possession, and specifically the extent to which it is disclosed to others. 
Anonymity, in contrast, is concerned with the attribution of information—can individuals 
be identified from the data that they provide or from other information relating to them? 
The fact that some individuals might be concerned about the disclosure of certain informa-
tion even if they saw no possibility of its being attributed to them—or conversely, that they 
might not wish their identity as a participant to be disclosed even if no other information 
relating to them were revealed—demonstrates that confidentiality and anonymity are not 
equivalent. Whilst confidentiality and anonymity refer to the use and attribution of infor-
mation, respectively, privacy has to do with initial access to information, and therefore 
comes into play before considerations of confidentiality and anonymity arise.6
As regards data, an assurance can be provided these will be reported anonymously, but 
if data are declared confidential this would seem to preclude their being directly reported in 
the form of quotations. Assurances of confidentiality in relation specifically to data are not 
therefore meaningful (unless anonymity is simply re-expressed in terms of the confidential-
ity of any identifying information). In terms of information other than data, such as infor-
mation about the context of the study or biographical details relating to participants, both 
6 Tolich (2016) argues against the usefulness of the concept of anonymity in qualitative research. However, 
he appears to construe anonymity solely in terms of what the researcher knows about the participant’s iden-
tity, whereas the more pressing issue is what others know. In focus groups, and in qualitative research more 
generally, the core issue is not whether data are gathered anonymously from participants, but whether they 
are stored and presented anonymously.
3 A similar issue may arise with regard to the audio-recording of the group discussion. Hennink (2007: p. 
36) suggests that participants should be told that they can ask for audio-taping equipment to be turned off at 
any time; any such request may not reflect the wishes of all participants.
4 In contrast, it might be argued that considerably more significant interests are at stake in terms of pro-
tecting a participant’s anonymity, and it would therefore be much harder to justify opposing a request for 
quotations to be withheld from the report. It should also be noted that a refusal to withdraw data on the 
basis of what was stated by the researcher in the consent process requires that this message had been clearly 
explained and was understood.
5 For example: ‘Participants need to be assured of the confidentiality and anonymity of their comments’ 
(Hennink 2007: p. 41); ‘participants must be guaranteed that they will not be identified by name or other-
wise, referred to as anonymity or confidentiality’ (Lincoln 2009: p. 152); ‘The primary method researchers 
use to preserve anonymity and confidentiality is the use of pseudonyms for participants and also for the 
location of the research. In addition, other practices, such as changing the reported characteristics of par-
ticipants (such as gender or occupation) are also used by some researchers to conceal identities and thereby 
maintain the confidentiality of the data provided by participants.’ (Crow and Wiles 2008, p. 2); ‘Confiden-
tiality means we are obliged to protect each participant’s identity, places and the location of the research’ 
(Ryen 2016: p. 33).
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anonymity and confidentiality are feasible, as such information may either be presented in 
a form that preserves anonymity, or may not be disclosed at all (particularly if any such 
disclosure would be hard without thereby breaching anonymity). An important relationship 
between confidentiality and anonymity is that confidentiality is of greatest concern if ano-
nymity cannot be assured.
The focus group is such that issues of confidentiality and anonymity are acute, espe-
cially when the discussion concerns sensitive topics:
The nature of the group setting is such that participants are obliged to express in pub-
lic what they usually regard as private, and neither the reaction nor the discretion of 
the group can necessarily be predicted. (Wellings et al. 2000: p. 256)
3.1  Deductive disclosure and internal confidentiality
An obvious way to preserve anonymity is to ensure that no real names or other directly 
identifying information are reported. However, individual participants may be identified 
by other, indirect means through what is referred to as deductive disclosure: ‘A narrative 
description of what an individual said to a researcher may, with a little collateral informa-
tion, be sufficient to identify the individual [even] if no clear identifier, such as a name, is 
attached to the description’ (Boruch et al. 1996: p. 161). Thus, even if nobody is named, it 
may be possible to link seemingly innocuous pieces of information together and determine 
a participant’s identity, particularly in small and/or geographically circumscribed commu-
nities. A classic example of this is Carolyn Ellis’s (1986) ethnographic study of two fishing 
villages in Chesapeake. Even though no directly identifying information had been used, it 
emerged that some participants in the study were able to identify themselves and others 
when the study was published (Ellis 1995). Two points about deductive disclosure bear 
emphasizing. First, the richer and more detailed the data reported, the greater the likeli-
hood of deductive disclosure (Edwards and Weller 2016). Second, it may not be clear to 
the researcher, as an ‘outsider’, which information carries a risk of deductive disclosure; 
some reported details that appear to have no identifying potential may hold such meaning 
for others within the community or social group in which the research is centred.
In the context of focus groups, Tolich (2009) draws a distinction between internal and 
external confidentiality. Whereas external confidentiality concerns the possible disclosure 
of information by the researcher, internal confidentiality has to do with information that 
might be disclosed by members of the group.7 Clearly, external confidentiality can nor-
mally be assured by the researcher, as he or she is in control of what is reported from 
the study. Internal confidentiality relies on adherence to ground rules and observance of 
aspects of the consent process, over both of which the researcher has much more limited 
control.
It is often recommended that focus groups should be composed of individuals previ-
ously unknown to each other, so that pre-existing relationships, and certain assumptions 
or expectations that these involve, do not influence disclosure (Morgan 1997). This assists 
in preserving anonymity, but if participants are known to one another, their anonymity is 
7 Rather confusingly, Tolich defines internal confidentiality in a different way in an earlier paper (Tolich 
2004: p. 101), as: ‘the ability for research subjects involved in the study to identify each other in the final 
publication of the research.’ This interpretation is closer to the notion of deductive disclosure, and we will 
follow the definition offered in the later paper (Tolich 2009).
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clearly harder to maintain.8 Additionally, the discussion within the group—and therefore 
what may be reported—may make reference to existing relationships or a shared history 
within the group, such that individuals may be recognized by others outside the focus 
group but within a broader social circle, through deductive disclosure. Bloor et al. (2001: 
p. 25) suggest that the situation in which participants know one another may lead to a form 
of third-party breach of confidentiality, whereby a participant may ‘make reference to a 
personal view or experience of another group member that that individual does not feel 
comfortable divulging within that particular group setting.’ Kitzinger and Barbour (1999: 
p. 17) provide an example of such ‘vicarious disclosure’ when noting that in one focus 
group a participant indicated that another woman had worked as a prostitute. In groups 
where individuals are already known to one another, information disclosed—and any sub-
sequent failure to observe confidentiality in respect of such information—may have a nega-
tive effect on participants’ future relationships (Hofmeyer and Scott 2007).
A linked issue to internal confidentiality is that of over-disclosure. Within any form of 
interview, the rapport that is established between the informant and the researcher, and the 
efforts of the latter to encourage views or experiences to be expressed, may lead to an indi-
vidual saying more than he or she might have wished or intended to. Within the specific 
context of a focus group, not only may the supportive atmosphere that can characterize 
the group encourage such over-disclosure (Bloor et al. 2001),9 but the group setting may 
make it less reparable than in a one-to-one interview. In particular, it is much harder to 
‘withdraw’ a comment in the public context of a focus group than in a one-to-one interview 
(Carey and Asbury 2012). Morgan (1998: p. 91) suggests that over-disclosure may be more 
likely to occur in a focus group involving strangers—‘talking with someone you will never 
see again can lead to self-disclosure that goes beyond what you would tell your friends or 
family’—but also argues, in common with Frith (2000), that the consequences of over-dis-
closure may be more acute in a focus group in which some or all participants are known to 
one another, owing to its potential influence on their future relationships. Through careful 
monitoring of the dialogue and interaction occurring within the group, the moderator can 
help to minimize the risk of over-disclosure.
The moderator can also minimize deductive disclosure, by omitting certain informa-
tion about participants in a report, by attributing quotations to categories of participants 
rather than pseudonymized individuals, or by altering other information that is potentially 
identifying. In the process, however, the ability of the researcher to present, or the reader 
to infer, valuable insights from the data may be reduced. Kaiser (2009: p. 1635) notes that 
‘unlike changing a specific name, changing additional details to render data unidentifiable 
can alter or destroy the original meaning of the data.’ Moreover, if measures such as these 
are taken, it should not be automatically assumed that this is in accordance with partici-
pants’ wishes. Whilst they may want their identity to be protected when a study is reported, 
they may nonetheless disapprove of the use of pseudonyms or categories, such as ‘lone 
8 A common means of preserving anonymity is to use pseudonyms or other anonymized identifiers. If par-
ticipants in a focus group are hitherto unknown to one another, pseudonyms can be used within the group 
discussion (Wong, 2008); this anonymizes both the dialogue and the resulting transcript. Using pseudo-
nyms in a focus group where participants are already acquainted effectively only serves to anonymize the 
transcript and may lead to a rather unnatural flow of dialogue. If data have not yet been anonymized, at the 
point of analysis pseudonyms or other anonymous identifiers can be substituted for real names, and these 
can be carried forward into the written research report.
9 Guest et al. (2017) found that certain sensitive themes or personal disclosures were more likely in focus 
groups than in individual interviews.
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parent’, that might invite negative stereotypes (Corden and Sainsbury 2006). Moreover, the 
unwillingness of some participants to use pseudonyms or to be anonymous may be a means 
of retaining ‘ownership’ of the meaning of their contributions to the data (Richards and 
Schwartz 2002).10 However, although acceding to a request not to use pseudonyms would 
respect the autonomous wishes of the individual(s) concerned, it might increase the likeli-
hood of deductive disclosure in respect of other participants.
A further means by which anonymity can be protected is to eliminate written records of 
participants’ true identities. Thus, in a focus group study of relationships between gay and 
bisexual men in the context of HIV infection and AIDS, O’Brien (1993) gained approval 
from an Institutional Review Board for the absence of signed consent forms.11
4  Risk of harm
Although in some respects focus groups offer a supportive environment to participants, the 
group context may also create a sense of public vulnerability:
In individual interviews respondents are protected by the relative intimacy and pri-
vacy of the interview situation. In a focus group session, in contrast, respondents 
are under pressure to perform (and possibly to conform) under the scrutiny of fellow 
participants. (Ransome 2013: p. 41)
This form of vulnerability may expose participants to various forms of harm. Thus, social 
or psychological harm may arise through a breach of confidentiality and/or anonymity. 
Information that is disclosed may lead to embarrassment, shame, stigmatization, discrimi-
nation, disruption of existing social relationships, or adverse employment consequences, 
and in some cases, participants may face legal action as a result of information that is made 
public (Warwick 1982).
However, harm may potentially arise in other ways than through breaches of confiden-
tiality or anonymity. For example, as noted earlier, participants may mistake a focus group 
that aims to explore a particular problem for one that seeks to solve such a problem, with 
the result that unfulfillable hopes are raised and subsequently disappointed. Alternatively, 
the discussion of particularly sensitive issues within the group context may cause dis-
tress or embarrassment. In some situations, such feelings may be directly associated with 
the topic—such as in a focus group centred on issues to do with sexual behaviour—and 
may therefore be anticipated. Participants may therefore be considered to have foreseen 
this possibility when providing consent. Furthermore, as such feelings are likely to result 
from any discussion of the topic in question, the fact that such discussion occurs within a 
research context may not raise special concerns. In other instances, however, owing to the 
way in which the discussion evolves spontaneously, participants may experience distress 
or embarrassment that they did not predict. The researcher needs to judge whether this is 
10 Perry (2011) points out that, in some communities, the changing of names may have negative cultural 
associations. Writing about social research in Sudan, she notes that forced name-changing was historically a 
means of repressing minorities.
11 The focus in this section has been on the protection of confidentiality. In some circumstances, however, 
there may be a moral or legal obligation on researchers to breach confidentiality by disclosing certain infor-
mation—e.g., a moral obligation to protect a third party from harm, or a legal obligation to report certain 
types of illegal activity (Bennett 2007). Such possibilities should, wherever possible, be included in the 
information given during the consent process.
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excessive or inappropriate. It is also important to note, however, that focus group discus-
sions can provide a very supportive forum in which participants can express their emotions 
or anxieties, and thereby have a beneficial rather than a harmful effect. Thus, Ybarra et al. 
(2014) found that the use of online focus groups conducted with gay and bisexual ado-
lescents on the topic of HIV prevention led to reduced feelings of isolation and a greater 
sense of support regarding decisions that some participants had made regarding abstinence. 
Again, the researcher needs to think carefully about the likely effects on the participants in 
the group.
Krueger and Casey (2009: p. xiii) maintain that focus group interviewing is ‘about pay-
ing attention, being open to what people have to say and being nonjudgmental.’ However, 
if participants express racist or other discriminatory views, the researcher should consider 
whether allowing such views to go unchallenged suggests complicity (Longhurst 2016). 
In a one-to-one interview such apparent acquiescence on the part of the researcher may 
reinforce the views of the individual concerned, but in a focus group it may additionally 
be construed as some form of public endorsement. In a similar way, harm may arise due 
to the expression of inaccurate information by a member of the group. The researcher may 
feel impelled to step out of the researcher role and intervene, or at least address the issue 
subsequently in a debrief. Hyde et al. (2005) and Wellings et al. (2000), for example, talk 
of the difficulty in staying silent in the face of factually incorrect comments in focus group 
discussions on HIV, and Kitzinger and Barbour (1999: p. 17) argue that one should not 
‘walk away from a group after having silently listened to people convincing each other 
that HIV can be transmitted by casual contact or that anal intercourse is safer than vaginal 
intercourse.’
There are two general approaches that the moderator can take in order to avoid or coun-
teract discomfort or distress that may arise from the discussion of sensitive issues: (1) to 
seek to prevent such issues from arising in the first place, either by declaring them to be 
‘off limits’ at the outset, or by averting them by steering the discussion in another direc-
tion; and (2) to try to minimize their impact when and if they do arise. The first of these 
approaches may seem an attractive solution. However, the issues concerned may be inte-
gral to the topic of the focus group, and avoiding them at the outset may, at least partly, 
frustrate the purpose of the research. Additionally, a strategy of avoidance may have the 
effect of denying certain individuals’ participation. In discussing focus group research in 
areas related to sexuality, Kitzinger and Farquhar (1999) suggest that excluding discussion 
of sexual abuse, and failing to frame any questions on this topic, may marginalize partici-
pants who have had such experiences and convey an assumption that nobody could con-
ceivably wish to discuss such issues in a public forum. In a similar way, Kleiber (2004: p. 
93) maintains that ‘it is important for the moderator to establish that no opinion or perspec-
tive is unacceptable’ and Morgan (1992: p. 185) describes how the moderator can ‘validate 
the expression of differences within the group.’ The strategy proposed by Kitzinger and 
Farquhar (1999: p. 170) is that focus group moderators should try to ensure that discus-
sion of sensitive issues is kept at an appropriate level, and ‘should avoid using their power 
within the research setting either to close off sensitive possibilities or to push them too far.’ 
Thus, a desire to avoid distress within focus groups—either by foreclosing certain topics 
at the beginning or by diverting the discussion when an issue arises—should be balanced 
against the risk of disenfranchising particular categories of individuals or censoring certain 
views as unacceptable.
The second approach—dealing with potential distress as it arises—relies on a prompt 
response on the part of the moderator. Owen (2001: p. 657) provides an example from her 
research on women’s mental health problems:
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Whilst the women were permitted to discuss their painful and emotional experiences, 
the discussion was moved on if it was evident that the women were becoming dis-
tressed. As far as possible this was done sensitively by waiting for a suitable break 
in the self disclosure, openly acknowledging the woman’s contribution, and posing 
another question to the group. More general questions were usually introduced at the 
end of each group in an attempt to lighten the atmosphere.
In some instances, distress can be prevented at an earlier stage, by managing the com-
position of the group. Thus, Bloor et al. (2001: p. 35) advise avoiding groups made up of 
‘individuals with such conflicting views that the resultant discussion might cause distress 
to individual members.’ It would, however, be important to balance this strategy against the 
need to obtain whatever range of views is important for the aims of the research.
4.1  Challenges in assessing harm
Underlying assessment of the risk of harm are three fundamental difficulties. The first 
is that both predicting and identifying harm are not straightforward in qualitative social 
research. In medical research, by way of contrast, the nature of possible harms may be fore-
seen—for example, known complications or side-effects of a pharmacological or surgical 
intervention. Furthermore, such effects may be recognized promptly, as participants may 
be under prolonged observation or monitoring by clinicians who know what to look for. 
In qualitative research, however, whilst some potential harms may be obvious and predict-
able, foreseeing others might depend on knowledge of individual participants’ psychologi-
cal characteristics or biography—information that the researcher may not possess, at least 
initially. It is important for the researcher to be alert to both verbal and nonverbal signs of 
potentially harmful emotions (Kavanaugh and Ayres 1998). However, in some respects, 
harm may be less readily identified in a focus group than in a face-to-face interview: firstly, 
because the public context of the group may make participants less willing to display feel-
ings of distress or embarrassment, and secondly because the moderator’s attention is less 
closely focused on a particular participant than in a one-to-one interview.
The second difficulty springs from the fact that, as Wiles (2013) points out, apparently 
innocuous topics can unexpectedly cause some individuals distress, and as Hammersley 
and Traianou (2012) indicate, what is a harm to one person may be a benefit to another. 
This has particular relevance in a group setting. For example, if the discussion in a focus 
group were to turn to matters of bereavement or sexual harassment, this might cause dis-
tress to some participants who had had such experiences, but for others in the group with 
these experiences the discussion might be welcome, by virtue of providing an opportunity 
to express feelings that they are rarely able to share and to seek support or validation from 
others (Dyregrov 2004; Butler et al. 2018); a similar observation by Ybarra et al. (2014) 
was noted earlier. Madriz (1998: p. 116) refers to this notion of validation when discuss-
ing her research on fear of crime with Latina women, and suggests that focus groups may 
provide ‘collective testimonies… [that] provide women with the possibility of breaking the 
wall of silence that has suppressed the expression of their ideas and emotions.’ Similarly, 
avoiding reference to sexual orientation or gender identity may prevent discomfort to some 
group members, but for any who are members of the LGBT community this may eliminate 
‘the opportunity for the particular needs of those individuals to be identified’ (Dodd 2009: 
p. 478). It should also be borne in mind that a focus group may draw on its own resources 
to limit potential harm (Kitzinger and Barbour 1999; Barbour 2018), especially if partici-
pants are previously known to one another and can enlist existing supportive relationships.
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The third difficulty is a conceptual one—that of distinguishing ‘harm’ from other 
unpleasant feelings and experiences, and thereby determining whether a moral wrong has 
been committed.12 Hitherto, we have used ‘harm’ in fairly broad sense. A more specific 
definition comes from Feinberg (1984: p. 34), who defines a harm as the ‘thwarting, setting 
back, or defeating of an interest’ (p. 33), where one’s interests comprise ‘all those things 
in which one has a stake.’ Accordingly, ‘[o]ne person harms another… by invading, and 
thereby thwarting or setting back, his interest’ (p. 34). These interests represent important 
aspects of a person’s well-being. However, not everything that is disliked or gives rise to 
negative emotions is harmful. Here, Feinberg refers to what he calls offences:
Passing annoyance, disappointment, disgust, embarrassment, and various other dis-
liked conditions such as fear, anxiety, and minor (“harmless”) aches and pains, are 
not in themselves necessarily harmful. (Feinberg 1985: p. 1)
A harm, on these definitions, is clearly harder to justify morally than an offence. Indeed, 
an offence may promote rather than undermine a person’s interest. If a discussion in a focus 
group causes a person to feel distress or embarrassment, this may be cathartic or lead to 
greater self-insight, which would presumably be in that person’s interest. Thus, Hutchinson 
et al. (1994) and Cook and Bosley (1995) outline some of the psychological benefits that 
may potentially occur through participating in interview research, even on sensitive topics, 
and Hollway and Jefferson (2013: pp. 90–91) point to a psychoanalytical model of research 
whose theoretical principles:
stress that well-being depends on making the causes of distress conscious… Accord-
ing to this model, it is not necessarily harmful if research raises painful and distress-
ing experience, though it may be discomforting.
Accordingly, it should not be assumed that all expressions of embarrassment, distress or 
other negative feelings within a focus group are necessarily harms and therefore a matter of 
moral concern.13
4.2  Justifying harm
A common means of justifying risk of harm in research is to point to a greater countervail-
ing benefit that may likely be gained through a study.14 This rests upon the assumption 
that harms and benefits are commensurable, and thereby capable of being offset, the one 
against the other (Macintyre 1982). There are, however, a number of important caveats to 
this justification. First, the magnitude of some harms may be so great that no resulting ben-
efits could justify them—though such harms might be very rare in social research (Diener 
and Crandall 1978). Second, steps must previously have been taken to minimize the risk of 
12 Thus, on this definition to harm somebody is to wrong him or her, but to cause that person distress does 
not necessarily do so.
13 An additional question that we do not address here, for reasons of space, is causal responsibility for 
harm. Hammersley and Traianou (2012) provide a detailed discussion of this issue.
14 We used this argument earlier as part of our justification of resisting any requests for data to be with-
drawn prior to analysis.
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harm, and it must be inherent to the topic and the nature of the research; risk of harm due 
to poor conduct of a study—such as insensitively worded questions or inattention to par-
ticipants’ emotional reactions—cannot be justified. Third, a precondition for any justifica-
tion is that participants should have been informed about, and consented to, the possibility 
of harm (to the extent to which previously noted limitations of the consent process allow). 
The harms in question, if they occur, must be assumed by participants, not imposed upon 
them. For example, Iphofen (2009: p. 54) suggests that a possible social harm resulting 
from focus group participation might be that:
the time taken to invest, say, in attending a focus group… may lead to participants 
being unable to attend a regular social event in their community or family which is 
vital to their acceptance and/or status within that community.
If a justification were required for this, it might point to the participant’s autonomous 
choice of one activity (the group discussion) over another (the social event).
Fourth, in addition to taking account of the relative magnitude of harms and benefits, 
these should also be weighed in probabilistic terms; using a remote chance of benefit to 
justify a likely risk of harm, other things being equal, would be questionable. Fifth, the 
type of harm and benefit should be considered. If a focus group study were to be carried 
out on aspects of self-harm in adolescents, the findings might have tangible medical or 
social benefits for adolescents in general, even if not necessarily for the specific partici-
pants in the study. Conversely, the same type of practical benefit might not be identifiable 
in a study on a topic where a more theoretical understanding is sought, yielding a more 
abstract value. Justifying a risk of harm in the second example might be harder than in the 
first.15
Finally, at a more conceptual level, such a weighing of harms against benefits—except 
when the harms and benefits affect the same individuals—relies to a large measure on an 
aggregate view; the fact that benefits, averaged across certain individuals, outweigh harms, 
averaged over other individuals, serves to justify these harms. Such a notion underlies Hen-
nink’s view that focus group researchers ‘need to continually weight the potential social 
benefits of the information sought against the potential risk of harm to participants’ (Hen-
nink 2007: p. 38). A different view of the matter would suggest that the welfare of indi-
viduals cannot so readily be subsumed under considerations of overall social benefit, and 
would reject, or at least set limits to, such a trade-off between harms and benefits. This 
view would suggest that harms and benefits should be individuated—such that it matters 
whose harm it is and whose benefit it is, and these cannot readily be traded off between 
individuals.16
Thus, whilst harms and benefits may in principle be commensurable, they may less 
readily be aggregated across individuals. For example, a series of focus groups might 
be run with parents who had suffered the perinatal loss of a child. If it were anticipated 
that some participants might become acutely distressed, this might be justified if it were 
believed that such feelings might be cathartic for the individuals in question and assist in 
15 Crucially, this is not to denigrate or underestimate the value of theoretical understanding, but merely to 
suggest that such benefit may have limited force in specific relation to the justification of risk of harm. See 
Hammersley and Traianou (2012) and Hammersley and Atkinson (2019) for a defence of the non-instru-
mental value of qualitative research.
16 The first line of moral reasoning outlined here is essentially a consequentialist one and the second essen-
tially a deontological one (Scheffler 1982; Kamm 2013).
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the grieving process. The risk of harm would be balanced against the possibility of benefit 
for those same individuals. If, however, the justification rested upon future improvements 
in policy and practice in perinatal care—affecting future parents—the fact that harms and 
benefits would be distributed between, not within, individuals makes the process of justifi-
cation more challenging.
5  Practical strategies
There are a number of ways in which the potentially problematic issues outlined hitherto 
can be avoided or mitigated, and some have already been touched upon. These strategies 
will be explored further in relation to the consent process, briefing prior to the focus group, 
the conduct and moderation of the focus group, and debriefing after the focus group.
The consent process: If the researcher provides information with a suitable level 
of detail and with due clarity, in principle this will help focus group participants to 
frame appropriate expectations of what will occur during the discussion. The pur-
pose of the focus group can be explained and examples given of the sorts of ques-
tions that will be asked. Clarification can also be provided on what will be done with 
the data to be collected and the steps to be taken to preserve confidentiality and/
or anonymity. Thus, certain assurances can be given, though these can strictly only 
relate to those aspects of the focus group over which the researcher has a degree of 
influence (Carey and Asbury 2012). Morgan (1998) and Tolich (2009) provide sug-
gested content for informed consent documentation.
Briefing: In addition to giving information in advance of a focus group, researchers 
normally discuss and negotiate a set of ground rules immediately prior to starting 
the discussion (Kevern and Webb 2001; Kleiber 2004; Breen 2006), especially in 
the case of sensitive topics (Farquhar 1999)—though Krueger (1998: p. 23) suggests 
that using a less formal term than ‘ground rules’ may be helpful so as not to stifle 
discussion. The researcher can emphasize the public nature of a focus group and the 
need for confidentiality and anonymity, and provide guidance on subjects that might 
be felt unsuitable to be raised during the discussion, subject to the caveats discussed 
earlier. The briefing also allows participants’ expectations of the group to be man-
aged, for example by pointing out that the group seeks to discuss a particular health 
or social problem, not to provide a solution to such a problem. Importantly, the col-
lective nature of the briefing allows the individual to reflect on his or her decision to 
take part in a situation that is closer than the formal consent process to the context 
of such participation. Furthermore, if at this point a participant has reconsidered the 
decision to take part in the study, the briefing can create an opportunity to withdraw 
less obtrusively than once the discussion has begun.
Conduct of the focus group: Although the moderator’s influence over what happens 
in a focus group may be limited, he or she can nonetheless try to ensure that all mem-
bers of the group have an opportunity to contribute to the discussion, without being 
under pressure to do so if unwilling, and that one or more individuals do not domi-
nate the group. Additionally, the moderator can be alert to distress, breaches of con-
fidentiality, or over-disclosure, and seek to turn the discussion in another direction 
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if appropriate.17 If sensitive or emotionally difficult topics have been discussed, it 
may be helpful to finish the discussion on a more neutral or positive note (Finch and 
Lewis 2003; Briller et al. 2007–8). It is also important to ensure, when discussion 
of such sensitive topics is intended or anticipated, that the moderator can respond 
appropriately. Even if not qualified to provide psychological therapy, the modera-
tor can offer emotional support (Rosenblatt 1995), and can take appropriate steps to 
ensure prompt access to qualified therapy through clinical referral (Carey and Asbury 
2012).
Debriefing: After the focus group has finished, and its content summarized to partici-
pants, the moderator can reiterate key messages around confidentiality and anonym-
ity, and clarify or comment upon any potentially sensitive or problematic issues that 
were raised during the discussion, where it was not appropriate to do so at the time. 
Participants can also be invited to discuss their reactions to such issues (Smith 1995). 
The moderator can stay in the room for a while at the end of the focus group, or oth-
erwise make him- or herself available, to give individual participants the opportunity 
to address any issues or concerns (Bloor et al. 2001; Sherriff et al. 2014).
The first two of the above approaches—the process of obtaining consent and the brief-
ing prior to the discussion—are means of providing information and giving certain assur-
ances as to what is and what is not intended or foreseen. Martin Tolich, however, is pes-
simistic regarding the researcher’s ability to provide assurances to focus group participants:
…let the researcher, the participants and the ethics committee beware that the only 
ethical assurance that can be given to focus group participants is that there are few 
ethical assurances. (Tolich 2009: p. 99)
He acknowledges the role of the moderator, but suggests that one should not rely unduly 
on the moderator’s skill in controlling the group, and has similar reservations regarding 
the use of ground rules or a debriefing session. Instead, Tolich’s central strategy is one of 
‘caveat emptor’:
Taking part in focus groups involves risk and the participants’ [sic] must have these 
risks identified for them, explicitly, and then be willing to absorb those risks. (Tolich 
2009: p. 106)18
In Tolich’s approach to the ethics of focus groups, the principal emphasis is accordingly 
on the quality of the consent process and participants’ autonomous assumption of certain 
risks, rather than on measures to mitigate ethical problems as they arise:
Ethical assurances, rather than safety techniques, should be at the fore. These 
assurances should be communicated to the potential participant in the recruitment 
phase of the research with such transparency that they allow the research partici-
pant to read in advance how the researcher plans to contend with the two endemic 
ethical flaws [relating to confidentiality and consent] in focus group research. 
Transparency is manifest in both an explicit description of the endemic flaws and 
18 He reflects this view in the information that he proposes as part of the consent documentation provided 
to participants: ‘There are risks in taking part in focus group research and taking part assumes that you are 
willing to assume those risks’ (Tolich 2009: p. 103).
17 Seymour et al. (2002) describe how presenting potentially sensitive topics in a PowerPoint presentation 
assisted the moderator in switching the group’s focus if the discussion became deeply personal.
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an honest statement on the limitations of any ethical assurances. (Tolich 2009: p. 
106)
On this basis, Tolich provides detailed suggestions as to the information that should 
be included in an informed consent form, building on earlier suggestions by Morgan 
(1998).
However, as a general strategy, it may be unwise to rely so heavily on the consent pro-
cess as a means of addressing ethical challenges in focus groups. First, as an empirical 
issue, providing information to participants as part of the consent process is only of value 
if this information is understood and recalled, and if it creates appropriate expectations of 
what will take place in the focus group. However, as noted earlier, the specific issues that 
are discussed in a focus group, and the way in which participants interact and behave dur-
ing the discussion, are to a large degree unpredictable, and participants’ expectations based 
on prior information may not be realized. Moreover, whilst its generalizability to social 
research may be questioned, evidence from the medical literature of poor recall and com-
prehension of consent information may caution us against over-reliance on some aspects of 
the consent process (Corrigan 2003; Dawson 2009). Second, at a more philosophical level, 
whilst consent may be a necessary condition for involving an individual in a study, it is not 
a sufficient condition—the researcher’s moral responsibility does not end with ensuring 
that participants make an informed and autonomous choice as regards participation. The 
focus group participant may well consent to the possibility of distress during the discus-
sion or the risk of a breach of confidentiality, but there are separate obligations on the part 
of the researcher—based on an independent notion of non-maleficence—to mitigate such 
risks as the discussion takes place. If these obligations are not discharged, the involvement 
of the participant may be morally unjustified, regardless of the apparent quality of the con-
sent process.
A more effective approach, perhaps, is to enlist all four of the strategies outlined above 
in approximately equal measure, so that one strategy may reinforce, or compensate for, 
another in a synergistic manner. In this way, the pre-discussion briefing can reiterate and 
re-emphasize information given in an information sheet as part of the consent process, and 
address any questions that may have subsequently arisen in participants’ minds. The brief-
ing can also raise issues regarding the conduct of the group—including ground rules—that 
might be less effectively conveyed by an information sheet. Moreover, such ground rules 
may be more effective if mutually negotiated by the group, rather than being stated in the 
consent documentation. Similarly, raising such issues at the level of the group, as opposed 
to when raised at an individual level in the consent process, may place them more clearly in 
the context to which they apply.
The process of moderation can attempt to deal with sensitive and potentially distressing 
issues that arise—perhaps unpredictably—through the dynamics of the interaction within 
the focus group. For example, Owen (2001) relates an incident in which a woman unex-
pectedly gave an account of her partner’s suicide and her feelings of loss and betrayal, and 
Seymour et al. (2002: p. 523) relate an incident in a focus group on end-of-life care where 
a woman stated ‘I’ve done euthanasia’—in both cases the moderator felt the need to take 
action to deal with the situation. If appropriate, at certain junctures in the discussion the 
moderator can also give reminders of matters of confidentiality outlined in the consent doc-
umentation and encourage observance of agreed ground rules. Finally, a debriefing after 
the group discussion can not only reinforce elements within each of the previous strategies, 
but may also provide an opportunity for individual participants to raise concerns that may 
have been difficult to address during the group discussion.
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6  Conclusion
In this paper we have attempted to identify and analyse some of the principal ethical issues 
that may arise within focus group research, and suggest practical approaches to managing 
these issues. Many of these issues stem from, or are given a particular emphasis by, the 
nature of focus group methodology. Thus, the spontaneous and at least partially unpre-
dictable nature of the dialogue between participants may give rise to problems to do with 
harm or confidentiality, and also limits the extent to which such problems can be identified 
in advance during the consent process. The dynamics within the group may lead to some 
individuals dominating the discussion and thereby denying the expression of others’ views. 
The group context also complicates matters by creating multiple, intersecting interests. 
What may cause distress to one participant may give voice to, or provide a sense of valida-
tion to, another participant. Similarly, steps taken to protect anonymity or confidentiality 
in respect of some participants may undermine the contribution of others. Further issues 
arise when a focus group takes place within the context of existing social or professional 
relationships.
Some of the ethical challenges posed by focus groups can be addressed through the con-
sent process, provided that appropriate expectations have been expressed and received, but 
steps should also be taken to supplement and reinforce these issues closer to the actual 
context of the focus group: in a briefing immediately prior to the discussion, during the dis-
cussion itself, and in a debriefing immediately after the focus group. However, the dynamic 
context of the focus group demands more than this. The moderator needs to make on-the-
spot judgements; for example, on whether or not some individuals are at risk of harm from 
the nature of the discussion taking place, or on whether a particular topic can be closed 
down without thereby depriving some participants of their voice.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the 
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Agar, M., MacDonald, J.: Focus groups and ethnography. Hum. Organ. 54(1), 78–86 (1995)
Barbour, R.: Doing Focus Groups, 2nd edn. Sage Publications, London (2018)
Beauchamp, T.L.: Informed consent. In: Veatch, R.M. (ed.) Medical Ethics, 2nd edn, pp. 185–208. Jones 
and Bartlett, Boston (1997)
Beauchamp, T.L.: Autonomy and consent. In: Miller, F., Wertheimer, A. (eds.) The Ethics of Consent: The-
ory and Practice, pp. 55–78. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2009)
Bennett, R.: Confidentiality. In: Ashcroft, R.E., Dawson, A., Draper, H., McMillan, J.R. (eds.) Principles of 
Health Care Ethics, 2nd edn, pp. 325–332. Wiley, Chichester (2007)
Bloor, M., Frankland, J., Thomas, M., Robson, K.: Focus Groups as Social Research. Sage, London (2001)
Boruch, R.F., Dennis, M., Cecil, J.S.: Fifty years of empirical research on privacy. In: Stanley, B.H., Sie-
ber, J.E., Melton, G.B. (eds.) Research Ethics: A Psychological Approach, pp. 129–173. University of 
Nebraska Press, Lincoln (1996)
Breen, R.L.: A practical guide to focus-group research. J. Geogr. High. Educ. 30(3), 463–475 (2006)
Briller, S.H., Schim, S.M., Meert, K.L., Thurston, C.S.: Special considerations in conducting bereavement 
focus groups. Omega 56(3), 255–271 (2007–8)
Butler, A.E., Hall, H., Copnell, C.: Bereaved parents’ experiences of research participation. BMC Palliat. 
Care 17, 122 (2018)
 J. Sim, J. Waterfield 
1 3
Carey, M.A., Asbury, J.-E.: Focus Group Research. Left Coast Press, Walnut Creek (2012)
Cook, A.S., Bosley, G.: The experience of participating in bereavement research: stressful or therapeutic? 
Death Stud. 19(2), 157–170 (1995)
Corden, A., Sainsbury, R.: Exploring ‘quality’: research participants’ perspectives on verbatim quotations. 
Int. J. Soc. Res. Methodol. 9(2), 97–110 (2006)
Corrigan, O.: Empty ethics: the problem with informed consent. Sociol. Health Illn. 25(3), 768–792 (2003)
Crow, G., Wiles, R.: Managing anonymity and confidentiality in social research: the case of visual data in 
community research: NCRM Working Paper Series 8/08. ESRC National Centre for Research Meth-
ods, Southampton (2008)
Dawson, A.: The normative status of the requirement to gain an informed consent in clinical trials: com-
prehension, obligations and empirical evidence. In: Corrigan, O., McMillan, J., Liddell, K., Richards, 
M., Weijer, C. (eds.) The Limits of Consent: A Socio-ethical Approach to Human Subject Research in 
Medicine, pp. 99–113. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2009)
Diener, E., Crandall, R.: Ethics in Social and Behavioural Research. Chicago University Press, Chicago 
(1978)
Dodd, S.-J.: LGBTQ: protecting vulnerable subjects in all studies. In: Mertens, D.M., Ginsberg, P.E. (eds.) 
The Handbook of Social Research Ethics, pp. 474–488. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks (2009)
Downie, R.S., Telfer, E.: Respect for Persons. George Allen & Unwin, London (1969)
Dyregrov, K.: Bereaved parents’ experience of research participation. Soc. Sci. Med. 58(2), 391–400 (2004)
Edwards, R., Weller, S.: Ethical dilemmas around confidentiality and anonymity in longitudinal research 
data sharing: the death of Dan. In: Tolich, M. (ed.) Qualitative Research Ethics in Practice, pp. 97–108. 
Routledge, London (2016)
Ellis, C.: Fisher Folk: Two Communities on Chesapeake Bay. University Press of Kentucky, Lexington 
(1986)
Ellis, C.: Emotional and ethical quagmires in returning to the field. J. Contemp. Ethnogr. 24(1), 68–98 
(1995)
Faden, R.R., Beauchamp, T.L.: A History and Theory of Informed Consent. Oxford University Press, New 
York (1986)
Farquhar, C.: Are focus groups suitable for ‘sensitive’ topics? In: Barbour, R.S., Kitzinger, J. (eds.) Devel-
oping Focus Group Research: Politics, Theory and Practice, pp. 47–63. Sage Publications, London 
(1999)
Feinberg, J.: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Volume 1: Harm to Others. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford (1984)
Feinberg, J.: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Volume 2: Offense to Others. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford (1985)
Finch, H., Lewis, J.: Focus groups. In: Ritchie, J., Lewis, J. (eds.) Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for 
Social Science Students and Researchers, pp. 170–198. Sage Publications, London (2003)
Frith, H.: Focusing on sex: using focus groups in sex research. Sexualities 3(3), 275–297 (2000)
Green, J., Hart, L.: The impact of context on data. In: Barbour, R.S., Kitzinger, J. (eds.) Developing Focus 
Group Research: Politics, Theory and Practice, pp. 21–35. Sage Publications, London (1999)
Grønkjær, M., Curtis, T., de Crespigny, C., Delmar, C.: Analysing group interaction in focus group research: 
impact on content and the role of the moderator. Qual. Stud. 2(1), 16–30 (2011)
Guest, G., Namey, E., Taylor, J., Eley, N., McKenna, K.: Comparing focus groups and individual interviews: 
findings from a randomized study. Int. J. Soc. Res. Methodol. 20(6), 693–708 (2017)
Halkier, B.: Focus groups as social enactments: integrating interaction and content in the analysis of focus 
group data. Qual. Res. 10(1), 71–89 (2010)
Hammersley, M., Atkinson, P.: Ethnography: Principles in Practice, 4th edn. Routledge, Abingdon (2019)
Hammersley, M., Traianou, A.: Ethics in Qualitative Research: Controversies and Contexts. Sage Publica-
tions, London (2012)
Hennink, M.M.: International Focus Group Research: A Handbook for the Health and Social Sciences. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2007)
Hofmeyer, A.T., Scott, C.M.: Moral geography of focus groups with participants who have pre-existing rela-
tionships in the workplace. Int. J. Qual. Methods 6(2), 69–79 (2007)
Hollway, W., Jefferson, T.: Doing Qualitative Research Differently: A Psychosocial Approach, 2nd edn. 
Sage Publications, London (2013)
Hutchinson, S.A., Wilson, M.E., Wilson, H.S.: Benefits of participating in research interviews. Image J. 
Nurs. Sch. 26(2), 161–166 (1994)
Hyde, A., Howlett, E., Brady, D., Drennan, J.: The focus group method: insights from focus group inter-
views on sexual health with adolescents. Soc. Sci. Med. 61(12), 2588–2599 (2005)
Iphofen, R.: Ethical Decision-Making in Social Research: A Practical Guide. Macmillan, Houndmills (2009)
Focus group methodology: some ethical challenges 
1 3
Kaiser, K.: Protecting respondent confidentiality in qualitative research. Qual. Health Res. 19(11), 1632–
1641 (2009)
Kamm, F.M.: Nonconsequentialism. In: LaFollette, H., Persson, I. (eds.) The Blackwell Guide to Ethical 
Theory, 2nd edn, pp. 261–286. Wiley Blackwell, Chichester (2013)
Kavanaugh, K., Ayres, L.: “Not as bad as it could have been”: assessing and mitigating harm during research 
interviews on sensitive topics. Res. Nurs. Health 21(1), 91–97 (1998)
Kervin, L., Vialle, W., Herrington, J., Okely, T.: Research for Educators. Thomson/Social Science Press, 
South Melbourne (2006)
Kevern, J., Webb, C.: Focus groups as a tool for critical social research in nurse education. Nurse Educ. 
Today 21(4), 323–333 (2001)
Kitzinger, J.: The methodology of focus groups: the importance of interaction between research partici-
pants. Sociol. Health Illn. 16(1), 103–121 (1994)
Kitzinger, J.: Introducing focus groups. Brit. Med. J. 311(7000), 299–302 (1995)
Kitzinger, J., Barbour, R.S.: Introduction: the challenge and promise of focus groups. In: Barbour, R.S., 
Kitzinger, J. (eds.) Developing Focus Group Research: Politics, Theory and Practice, pp. 1–20. 
Sage Publications, London (1999)
Kitzinger, J., Farquhar, C.: The analytical potential of ‘sensitive moments’ in focus group discussions. 
In: Barbour, R.S., Kitzinger, J. (eds.) Developing Focus Group Research: Politics, Theory and Prac-
tice, pp. 156–172. Sage Publications, London (1999)
Kleiber, P.B.: Focus groups: more than a method of qualitative inquiry. In: deMarrais, K.B., Lapan, S. 
(eds.) Foundations for Research: Methods of Inquiry in Education and the Social Sciences, pp. 
87–102. Routledge, New York (2004)
Krueger, R.A.: Moderating Focus Groups. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks (1998)
Krueger, R.A., Casey, M.A.: Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research, 4th edn. Sage Pub-
lications, Thousand Oaks (2009)
Lezaun, J.: A market of opinions: the political epistemology of focus groups. Sociol. Rev. 55(2 suppl), 
130–151 (2007)
Lincoln, Y.S.: Ethical practices in qualitative research. In: Mertens, D.M., Ginsberg, P.E. (eds.) The 
Handbook of Social Research Ethics, pp. 150–169. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks (2009)
Lincoln, Y.S., Guba, E.G.: Naturalistic Inquiry. Sage Publications, Newbury Park (1985)
Longhurst, R.: Semi-structured interviews and focus groups. In: Clifford, N., Cope, M., Gillespie, T., 
French, S. (eds.) Key Methods in Geography, pp. 143–156. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks 
(2016)
Lowton, K.: He said, she said, we said: ethical issues in conducting dyadic interviews. In: Iphofen, R., 
Tolich, M. (eds.) The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research Ethics, pp. 133–147. Sage Publica-
tions, London (2018)
Macintyre, A.: Risk, harm and benefit assessments as instruments of moral evaluation. In: Beauchamp, 
T.L., Faden, R.R., Wallace, R.J., Walters, L. (eds.) Ethical Issues in Social Science Research, pp. 
175–189. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore (1982)
Madriz, E.I.: Using focus groups with lower socioeconomic status Latina women. Qual. Inq. 4(1), 114–
128 (1998)
Merton, R.K., Fiske, M., Kendall, P.L.: The Focused Interview: A Manual of Problems and Procedures. 
Free Press, Glencoe (1956)
Morgan, D.L.: Designing focus group research. In: Stewart, M., Tudiver, F., Bass, M.J., Dunn, E.V., Norton, 
P.G. (eds.) Tools for Primary Care Research, pp. 177–193. Sage Publications, Newbury Park (1992)
Morgan, D.L.: Focus Groups as Qualitative Research, 2nd edn. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks (1997)
Morgan, D.L.: The Focus Group Guidebook. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks (1998)
O’Brien, K.: Improving survey questionnaires through focus groups. In: Morgan, D.L. (ed.) Successful 
Focus Groups: Advancing the State of the Art, pp. 105–117. Sage Publications, Newbury Park (1993)
Owen, S.: The practical, methodological and ethical dilemmas of conducting focus groups with vulner-
able clients. J. Adv. Nurs. 36(5), 652–658 (2001)
Perry, K.H.: Ethics, vulnerability, and speakers of other languages: how university IRBs (do not) speak 
to research involving refugee participants. Qual. Inq. 17(10), 899–912 (2011)
Ransome, P.: Ethics and Values in Social Research. Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills (2013)
Richards, H.M., Schwartz, L.J.: Ethics of qualitative research: are there special issues for health services 
research? Fam. Pract. 19(2), 135–138 (2002)
Rosenblatt, P.C.: Ethics of qualitative interviewing with grieving families. Death Stud. 19(2), 139–155 
(1995)
Ryen, A.: Research ethics and qualitative research. In: Silverman, D. (ed.) Qualitative Research, pp. 
31–46. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks (2016)
 J. Sim, J. Waterfield 
1 3
Scheffler, S.: The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations 
Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions. Clarendon Press, Oxford (1982)
Schnüriger, H.: What is consent? In: Müller, A., Schaber, P. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of the Eth-
ics of Consent, pp. 21–31. Routledge, Oxford (2018)
Schwarz, M., Landis, S.E., Rowe, J.E., Janes, C.L., Pullman, N.: Using focus groups to assess primary 
care patients’ satisfaction. Eval. Health Prof. 23(1), 58–71 (2000)
Seymour, J., Bellamy, G., Gott, M., Ahmedzai, S.H., Clark, D.: Using focus groups to explore older people’s 
attitudes to end of life care. Ageing Soc. 22(4), 517–526 (2002)
Sherriff, N., Gugglberger, L., Hall, C., Scholes, J.: “From start of finish”: practical and ethical considera-
tions in the use of focus groups to evaluate sexual health service interventions for young people. Qual. 
Psychol. 1(2), 92–106 (2014)
Sim, J.: Conflicts in research ethics: consent and risk of harm. Physiother. Res. Int. 15(2), 80–87 (2010)
Smith, J.A., Scammon, D.L., Beck, S.L.: Using patient focus groups for new patient services. Jt. Comm. J. 
Qual. Improv. 21(1), 22–31 (1995)
Smith, M.W.: Ethics in focus groups: a few concerns. Qual. Health Res. 5(4), 478–486 (1995)
Smithson, J.: Using and analysing focus groups: limitations and possibilities. Int. J. Soc. Res. Methodol. 
3(2), 103–119 (2000)
Stewart, D.W.: Focus groups. In: Frey, B.B. (ed.) The SAGE Encyclopedia of Educational Research, Meas-
urement, and Evaluation, vol. 2, pp. 687–692. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks (2018)
Tolich, M.: Internal confidentiality: when confidentiality assurances fail relational informants. Qual. Sociol. 
27(1), 101–106 (2004)
Tolich, M.: The principle of caveat emptor: confidentiality and informed consent as endemic ethical dilem-
mas in focus group research. Bioeth. Inq. 6(1), 99–108 (2009)
Tolich, M.: Are qualitative research ethics unique? In: Tolich, M. (ed.) Qualitative Research Ethics in Prac-
tice, pp. 33–47. Routledge, London (2016)
Walker, T.: Consent and autonomy. In: Müller, A., Schaber, P. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics 
of Consent, pp. 131–139. Routledge, Oxford (2018)
Warr, D.J.: “It was fun… but we don’t usually talk about these things”: analyzing sociable interaction in 
focus groups. Qual. Inq. 11(2), 200–225 (2005)
Warwick, D.P.: Types of harm in social research. In: Beauchamp, T.L., Faden, R.R., Wallace, R.J., Walters, 
L. (eds.) Ethical Issues in Social Science Research, pp. 101–124. Johns Hopkins University Press, Bal-
timore (1982)
Wellings, K., Branigan, P., Mitchell, K.: Discomfort, discord and discontinuity as data: using focus groups 
to research sensitive topics. Cult. Health Sex. 2(3), 255–267 (2000)
Wiles, R.: What are Qualitative Research Ethics? Bloomsbury, London (2013)
Wilkinson, S.: Focus groups in feminist research: power, interaction, and the co-production of meaning. 
Women’s Stud. Int. Forum 21(1), 111–125 (1998)
Wong, L.P.: Focus group discussion: a tool for health and medical research. Singap. Med. J. 49(3), 256–261 
(2008)
Ybarra, M.L., DuBois, L.Z., Parsons, J.T., Prescott, T.L., Mustanski, B.: Online focus groups as an HIV 
prevention program for gay, bisexual, and queer adolescent males. AIDS Educ. Prev. 26(6), 554–564 
(2014)
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and 
institutional affiliations.
